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Comment
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE FCC'S FINANCIAL INTEREST
AND SYNDICATION RULES
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, three major broadcast television networks (net-
works)1 dominated the television industry. The networks main-
tained their dominance into the 1970s by developing an extensive
communications system of network owned and operated television
stations and independently owned stations affiliated with the net-
works.2 The networks' market dominance enabled them to com-
1. In 1992, the Code of Federal Regulations defined a network as:
any person, entity, or corporation providing on a regular basis more than
fifteen (15) hours of prime time programming per week.., to intercon-
nected affiliates that reach, in aggregate, at least of seventy-five (75) per-
cent of television households nationwide; and/or any person, entity, or
corporation controlling, controlled by, or under common control with
such person, entity, or corporation.
47 C.F.R. § 73.662(i) (1992), amending47 C.F.R. § 73.658() (4) (1991). The major
broadcast television networks that fit this definition at that time were Capital Cit-
ies/American Broadcasting Company, Inc. (ABC), Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tems, Inc. (CBS) and National Broadcasting Company, Inc. (NBC). Financial
Interest and Syndication Rules, Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,242-01, 26,242 n.2
(1991) [hereinafter Final Rule]. The author uses network to refer only to ABC,
NBC and CBS.
The Fox Broadcasting Company (Fox) has grown to fit the definition of a
network. Id. However, Fox was granted a temporary exemption from the 1991
financial interest and syndication (Fin-Syn) rules (1991 rules) and was, therefore,
not included in the 1992 network definition. Id.; see Fox Broadcasting Co., 5
F.C.C.R. 3211 (1990)(granting Fox temporary waiver of 1991 rules pending com-
pletion of Fin-Syn proceedings), amended by Order, F.C.C. 91-149 (1991). The Or-
der extended Fox's waiver until the effective date of rule changes adopted in the
Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, Second Report and
Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 3282 (1993) [hereinafter Second R & 0] (codified at 47 C.F.R
§ 73). The Second R & 0 amended the 1991 rules in accordance with the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's decision in Schurz Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992)
(1991 rules codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.6580), Rules and Regulations of the Federal
Communications Commission).
2. See Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1045 (7th Cir.
1992). Independent stations electronically connected to networks by cable or sat-
ellite are referred to as affiliates. Id. An affiliated station is further defined as
a station having a regular affiliation with one of the three national televi-
sion networks, under which it serves as that network's primary outlet for
the presentation of its programs in a market. It includes any arrange-
ment under which the network looks primarily to this station rather than
(67)
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mand the profits from the financing and syndication 3 of successful
television programs, and to control the distribution of programs
throughout the country.4
In response to public concern that the networks' dominance
amounted to a monopoly,5 the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) adopted expansive regulations in 1970 to shift control
of the television market from the networks to independent pro-
gram suppliers.6 As part of the FCC regulations, the financial inter-
other stations for the presentation of its programs and the station chiefly
presents the programs of this network rather than any other network.
47 C.F.R. § 73.658(1) (1) (iii) (1992).
3. Syndication is the licensing of successful television programs for broadcast-
ing on a daily basis during non-prime time hours. Amendment of 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.658 (j)(1)(i), (ii), the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, Tentative De-
cision and Request for Further Comments, 94 F.C.C.2d 1019, 1 5 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Tentative Decision] (seeking comment on proposal to repeal Fin-Syn rules).
Syndicators are typically "studios, multiple station groups, advertisers or companies
set up specifically to act as syndicators." Id. Syndication rights are typically negoti-
ated during the production process or while the program is in its first run. Id. 1 6.
Negotiations include agreements on syndication revenues, duration of the syndica-
tion rights, programming territory and cash advances. Id. After a syndication
agreement has been reached, the syndicator sells the program to individual sta-
tions. Id. If the program is purchased by a significant number of stations, the
program goes into syndication. Id.
4. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1045.
5. Id. The court in Schurz stated that the FCC decided to limit the networks
because the networks already controlled a significant portion of the distribution
system used to project television programs into American households. Id. The
court described the FCC's fear of a network monopoly which motivated the FCC to
implement the Fin-Syn rules:
[Networks] would .. . refuse to buy programs for network distribution
unless the producers agreed to surrender their syndication rights to the
network. For once the networks controlled those rights, the access of
independent television stations, that is, stations not owned by or affiliated
with one of the networks, to reruns would be at the sufferance of the
networks, owners of a competing system of distribution. Market power in
buying has the same misallocative effects as the more common market
power in selling. The relation is especially close in this case because the
networks can just as well be viewed as sellers of a distribution service as
they can be as buyers of programs-the less they pay for programs, the
more in effect they charge for distributing them.
Id.
6. Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations with
Respect to Competition and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting,
Report and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 382 (1970) [hereinafter Amendment of Part 73]; see
also Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 345 (1992) [hereinafter Memorandum 0 & 0]
(adopted October 24, 1991 and released November 22, 1991), modified, Second R &
0, 8 F.C.C.R. 3282 (1993).
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est and syndication (Fin-Syn) rules7 limited the networks' ability to
finance and syndicate television programming within the industry.8
By 1978, changes in the television industry reduced the net-
works' dominance. 9 Changes included the augmentation of alter-
native viewing sources, such as videocassette recorders, cable
television, pay television and pay-per-view.' 0 Additionally, competi-
tion for premium programming such as major sporting events in-
creased and the networks were increasingly unable to match the
bids offered by cable and video companies for this programming
because they could not profit from the syndication market place. 1
Accordingly, in 1991 the FCC modified the 1970 rules.12 In
particular, the FCC relaxed the financial interest and syndication
restrictions placed on the networks. 13 The FCC's modified Fin-Syn
rules had two goals: (1) to furnish the networks with greater oppor-
7. 47 C.F.R. § 73.6580) (1970). The FCC adopted the Prime Time Access
Rule (PTAR) concurrently with the Fin-Syn rules. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1993).
The PTAR limited the amount of network and off-network programming that a
network affiliate in the 50 largest television markets could broadcast during prime
time. Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 5 F.C.C.R. 6463, 1 34 (1990). The FCC prohibited network
television stations from presenting "more than three hours... of programs from a
national network, programs formerly on a national network (off-network pro-
grams) ... or, on Saturdays, feature films" during prime time hours. 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.658(k). A prime time program is defined as one that is exhibited between
7:00 and 11:00 p.m. eastern and pacific time or 6:00 and 10:00 p.m. central and
mountain time. 47 C.F.R. § 73.662(g) (1992) (redesignated to § 73.662(d) in 58
Fed. Reg. 28,927-01, 28,932 (1993)). Programs such as children's programs, pub-
lic affairs programs, documentaries, news broadcasts and special news programs
were exempt from the PTAR's three hour limitation. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k).
8. See Amendment of Part 73, 23 F.C.C.2d at 382.
9. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1046. The court acknowledged the "profound" changes
in the television industry and stated:
The three networks have lost ground, primarily as a result of the expan-
sion of cable television, which now reaches 60 percent of American
homes, and videocassette recorders, now found in 70 percent of Ameri-
can homes. Today each of the three networks buys only 7 percent of the
total video and film programming sold each year, which is roughly a third
of the percentage in 1970 .... And each commands only about 12 per-
cent of total television advertising revenues. Where in 1970 the networks
had 90 percent of the prime-time audience, today they have 62 percent,
and competition among as well as with the three networks is fierce. They
are, moreover, challenged today by a fourth network, the Fox Broadcast-
ing Corporation, which emerged in the late 1980s.
Id.
10. Id.
11. See Suzanne Rosencrans, The Questionable Validity of the Network Syndication
and Financial Interest Rules in the Present Media Environmen 43 FED. COMM. LJ. 65,
66 (1990).
12. Memorandum 0 & 0, 7 F.C.C.R. 345 (1992).
13. See Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 3282 (1993); Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,241-
01 (1991).
1994]
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tunities in program production and syndication and (2) to main-
tain diversity in program sources for networks and local
independent and affiliate television stations. 14
In Schurz Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion,15 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
vacated the FCC's decision in 1991 to adopt the modified Fin-Syn
rules.' 6 The court agreed with the networks' argument that the sig-
nificant changes in the television industry's structure necessitated
changes to the original Fin-Syn rules.1 7 The court determined that
the FCC's 1991 Fin-Syn rules did not adequately address these
changes.' 8 The Seventh Circuit stated that the FCC's justifications
for the modified rules were inadequate although the rules ap-
peared to be acceptable. 19
The FCC has since modified the 1991 Fin-Syn rules and conse-
quently has relaxed its firm regulatory grip over the networks. 20
This Comment first discusses the background and evolution of the
Fin-Syn rules. This Comment then analyzes Schurz and the FCC's
actions in response to the court's decision. Against this backdrop,
this Comment summarizes the FCC's 1991 and 1993 Fin-Syn rules.
This Comment concludes that the FCC's modified 1993 rules ade-
quately addressed the court's orders in Schurz.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Evolution of the Fin-Syn Rules
In 1934, Congress created the FCC pursuant to its interstate
commerce powers. 21 Congress established the FCC as an agency to
14. Memorandum 0 & 0, 7 F.C.C.R. 1 4.
15. 982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992).
16. Id. at 1043, 1055.
17. Id. at 1046. For a discussion of the networks' gradual market decline, see
supra note 9 and accompanying text.
18. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1049-55.
19. Id. at 1049-50; see Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (discussing courts' obligations when reviewing agency actions, stating "our
review must be 'searching and careful,' . . . and we must ensure both that the
Commission has adequately considered all relevant factors . . . and that it has
demonstrated a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.'" (citations omitted)). For a further discussion ofjudicial review of admin-
istrative rulings, see infra note 73 and accompanying text.
20. Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 3282 (1993); see also Broadcast Service; Financial
Interest and Syndication Rule, Final Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,842 (1993) (confirming
August 26, 1993 as effective date of FCC amendments to 47 C.F.R § 73.661).
21. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). Section 151 states that the FCC was created:
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in com-
munication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to
all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide [sic],
4
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oversee the foreign and interstate commerce of the communica-
tions industry.22 The FCC's authority to regulate the communica-
tions industry includes authorizing the use of communications
signals, distributing and regulating television broadcast licenses and
ensuring the availability of an efficient communications system.23
The FCC's broad regulatory power is only limited by the statutory
requirement that the FCC "act in accordance with the public inter-
est, convenience, or necessity."24
As the television industry expanded during the 1950s, the FCC
investigated the networks' programming practices.25 The FCC
and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate fa-
cilities at reasonable charges.., and for the purpose of securing a more
effective execution of this policy by centralizing authority heretofore
granted by law to several agencies and by granting additional authority
with respect to interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio
communication.
Id.
22. Id.
23. Schuz, 982 F.2d at 1048. The FCC's most powerful use of its broad regula-
tory power is its control of the networks' broadcast licenses. Id. The FCC has
utilized its extensive power to condition the renewal of broadcast licenses "on the
networks' accepting constraints intended to maximize the Commission's concep-
tion of the social benefits of broadcasting." Id.; see also NBC v. United States, 319
U.S. 190 (1943) (holding FCC's chain broadcasting regulations enforceable under
1934 Communications Act). The FCC's control over license distribution includes
licenses held by network owned and operated stations. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1048.
24. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1048; see 47 U.S.C. § 151. The court discussed the
broad standard with which the FCC must comply, stating "[s] o nebulous a mandate
invests the Commission with an enormous discretion and correspondingly limits
the practical scope of responsible judicial review." Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1048. Addi-
tionally, the court stated that "[w]ith the blessing of the Supreme Court the Com-
mission has used this authority . . . to regulate activities by networks that are
remote from the concerns with signal interference that first summoned federal
regulation of the airwaves into being." Id.
The FCC is headed by five Commissioners who are appointed to five-year
terms by the President, one of whom is designated as chairman. 47 U.S.C.
§ 154(a) (1988). The Commissioners must meet at least once each month to re-
view all orders and take appropriate action. Id. § 155(d). They must attempt to
render final decisions on non-hearing matters within three months and on matters
requiring a hearing, within six months. Id.
25. See Order for Investigatory Proceeding, 24 Fed. Reg. 1605 (1959). The
FCC used these proceedings "to obtain information relating 'to the policies and
practices pursued by the networks and others in the acquisition, ownership, pro-
duction, distribution, selection, sale and licensing of programs for television exhi-
bition.'" Tentative Decision, 94 F.C.C.2d 1019, 1 15 (1983) (quoting Order for
Investigatory Proceeding, 24 Fed. Reg. 1605 (1959)). The FCC continued its inves-
tigation of the networks' programming practices into the 1960s. See generally
Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules & Regulations with Respect to
Competiton and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting, 45 F.C.C.R.
2146 (1965) [hereinafter Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). In 1965, the FCC
sought to correct the anti-competitive nature that existed in the television market
by proposing the precursor to the Fin-Syn rules. Id. However, the FCC did not
1994]
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found that the networks had accumulated power over the financ-
ing, development and syndication of television programming.26
The networks were able to exact concessions from program suppli-
ers27 and select and cancel programs on the basis of the networks'
own potential profit, irrespective of the public's interest in the pro-
gram.28 Additionally, the networks, as owners and operators of the
majority of television stations and affiliated stations, controlled the
distribution of television programs to homes throughout the coun-
try.29 The FCC adopted the Fin-Syn rules in response to the FCC's
findings that the networks controlled the production and distribu-
tion of programming.30
The FCC created the 1970 Fin-Syn rules (1970 rules) to pro-
mote two public interest goals.3 ' First, the FCC sought to increase
competition and diversity in programs supplied to the average net-
work television viewer.3 2 Second, the FCC sought to spur the crea-
tion of a syndication market driven by competition and diversity.33
officially adopt the Fin-Syn restrictions until 1970. See Amendment of Part 73, 23
F.C.C.2d 382 (1970).
26. Memorandum 0 & 0, 7"F.C.C.R. 345, 1 3 (1992).
27. Rosencrans, supra note 11, at 66-67. These concessions came "either in
the form of profit sharing in the syndication rights or a distribution fee for the
selling of these rights (or both)." Id. at 67 (citing Amendment of Part 73, 23
F.C.C.2d 382, 1 19 (1970)).
28. Rosencrans, supra note 11, at 67.
29. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1045. The networks dictated what the American public
would be shown at the most popular viewing times and restricted the public's ac-
cess to alternative programming sources. Tentative Decision, 94 F.C.C.2d 1019, 15
(1983) (citing Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 45 F.C.C. 2146, 2147 (1965)). The
FCC specifically noted:
that network corporations . . . have adopted and pursued practices in
television program procurement and production through which they
have progressively achieved virtual domination of television program
markets. The result is that the three national network corporations not
only in large measure determine what the American people may see and
hear ... but also would appear to have unnecessarily and unduly fore-
closed access to other sources of programs.
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 45 F.C.C. 1 4. The FCC ultimately decided that
the networks' concentration of power was contrary to the principles established in
the Communications Act. Tentative Decision, 94 F.C.C.2d 1 16; see 47 U.S.C. § 151
(1988).
30. Amendment of Part 73, 23 F.C.C.2d 382 (1970); see also Mt. Mansfield Televi-
sion, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding Fin-Syn rules were
reasonable).
31. Memorandum 0 & 0, 7 F.C.C.R. 345, 1 3 (1992).
32. Id.
33. Id. The FCC hoped to promote diversity in the television programming
marketplace by "curtailing the ability of the networks to supply the program mar-
ket represented by the independent stations, and by protecting the producers for
that market against being pressured into giving up potentially valuable syndication
rights." Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1045-46. Thus an alternative source of supply would be
6
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The 1970 rules: (1) prohibited television networks from acquiring
any financial interest in the broadcast of programs not solely pro-
duced by the network, but allowed these programs to be aired on
the network; (2) prohibited networks from engaging in the domes-
tic syndication business or from having an ongoing interest in the
syndication of programs for non-network broadcast distribution
and (3) allowed networks to syndicate foreign programs that they
had solely produced or that foreign entities had produced.3 4
By 1978,35 the FCC questioned the necessity of the Fin-Syn re-
strictions and ordered an extensive study of the television industry's
evolution and the concurrent effects of the rules.A6 The study
demonstrated that the networks' success in program distribution re-
sulted from their ability to allocate production costs to numerous
television stations in various markets. 3 7 The study's authors also
noted that the networks' power resulted from the existence of strict
entrance barriers into the industry38 and not from the advantages
available to independent stations through non-network television producers. Id. at
1045.
34. Memorandum 0 & 0, 7 F.C.C.R. 1 2.
35. Rosencrans, supra note 11, at 68. In 1977, ABC, CBS and NBC entered
into consent decrees with the Department of Justice after they were charged with
violating the Sherman Antitrust Act. Id. at 67; see United States v. ABC, 1981-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,150 (C.D. Cal. 1980), reprinted in 45 Fed. Reg. 58,441
(1980); United States v. CBS, 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,594 (C.D. Cal. 1980),
reprinted in 45 Fed. Reg. 34,465 (1980), modified, 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,284
(C.D. Cal. 1986); United States v. NBC, 449 F. Supp. 1127 (C.D. Cal. 1978), aft'd,
603 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1979) (approving consentjudgment wherein federal govern-
ment sought antitrust relief in connection with networks' practices, including fi-
nancial interest and syndication), cert. denied sub. nom. CBS v. United States District
Court for Cent. Div. of Cal., 444 U.S. 830 (1979). Although the consent decrees
largely paralleled the FCC's Fin-Syn restrictions, the decrees actually increased re-
strictions in certain areas. Rosencrans, supra note 11, at 67; see also Amendment of 47
C.F.R § 73.658U); The Syndication and Financial Interest Rule: Hearings on H.R. 2250
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). These addi-
tional restrictions limited the production hours of network programming and lim-
ited the amount of programming the networks could syndicate outside the United
States. Id.
36. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1047 (citing NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, FINAL
REPORT, NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS: ENTRY, JURISDICTION, OWNERSHIP AND RELA-
TION (1980)).
37. Rosencrans, supra note 11, at 68.
38. Id. The following describes the strict entrance barriers to television pro-
gramming production:
Through their de facto control of time-rental of evening hours on the
vast majority of television stations throughout the country networks con-
trol market entry. In turn this enables them to dictate the form and con-
tent of the so-called creative efforts by writers, directors, and producers.
Indeed, in most cases program form and pilot development are deter-
mined by the direct intervention or known preferences of the network
1994]
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the Fin-Syn rules were designed to allay.3 9 However, the FCC ac-
knowledged that entrance barriers to the programming market
were eroding with the birth of satellite technology and the reformu-
lation of many FCC policies, so that new networks would soon have
the opportunity to enter the television industry.40 Guided by the
1978 inquiry, the FCC acknowledged that its intervention was un-
necessary and concluded that the 1970 rules should be repealed. 41
This conclusion led the FCC to take affirmative steps in 1983 to
remedy the perceived inadequacies of the 1970 rules. 42 The FCC
issued a Tentative Decision45 in which it proposed revisions that
would have repealed the majority of the Fin-Syn rules.44 Following
the release of the Tentative Decision, however, the major motion pic-
ture studios, seeking to preserve their dominance in the syndication
market, started an influential lobbying campaign to delay the ef-
fects of the decision.45 Because the motion picture industry had
dominated the $5 billion-a-year syndication market for over twenty-
five years, it lobbied aggressively for the retention of the most strin-
gent Fin-Syn restrictions. 46 The industry's lobbying efforts resulted
managers. At the outset of the production process a formula is set out in
terms of specifics designed to produce circulation through application of
what network managers conceive to be the tastes and preferences of the
largest undifferentiated mass audience. In this way networks make use of
their economic power to dictate the terms of entry into television pro-
gram markets and to prescribe the type and content of the product of
that market.
Amendment of Part 73, 23 F.C.C.2d 382, Appendix II, 12 (1970) (footnotes
omitted).
39. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1047.
40. Rosencrans, supra note 11, at 68-69.
41. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1047; see Rosencrans, supra note 11, at 68.
42. Prior to the FCC's 1983 Tentative Decision, the Second Circuit decided to
loosen the firm grip of the Fin-Syn restrictions. SeeViacom Int'l, Inc. v. FCC, 672
F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1982). In Viacom, the Second Circuit interpreted the Fin-Syn
rules as applying only to broadcast uses of material, rather than prohibiting net-
work acquisition of rights to all subsequent uses of independently produced pro-
gramming. Id.; see Rosencrans, supra note 11, at 68. The court held that the
networks could continue their involvement in programming sales to cable and
home video outlets and share in the profits from merchandising. Id.
43. Tentative Decision, 94 F.C.C.2d 1019 (1983).
44. Schuz, 982 F.2d at 1047 (citing Tentative Decision, 94 F.C.C.2d 1019
(1983)).
45. Rosencrans, supra note 11, at 70-72.
46. See Tom Shales, On the Air; The FCC and the Threat to Free TV; Regulations
Haven't Changed with the Times, WASH. PosT, Apr. 8, 1991, at Cl; Cindy Skrzycki,
Ruling Eases Hollywood's Grip on TV Syndication, WASH. Posr, Apr. 2, 1993, at F1.
The motion picture industry's lobbying efforts in Washington, D.C. were well re-
ceived because the motion picture industry had significant ties to government offi-
cals. Rosencrans, supra note 11, at 70. These ties included former President
Ronald Reagan. Id. In fact, the Los Angeles Times reported on a "secret" meeting
8
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in congressional pressure which quelled any action regarding the
rules for several years.47 The status of the 1970 rules remained un-
resolved because the FCC did not take immediate action to revive
the Tentative Decision.
48
In 1990, the Fox Broadcasting Company (Fox) 49 resurrected
the debate over the Fin-Syn rules by requesting an exemption from
the rules.50 The FCC initially announced it would conduct a
new notice-and-comment rulemaking proceeding, in response to
Fox's request, to address the inadequacies of the rules.5' However,
the television industry expressed an overwhelming interest in
between then chairman of the FCC, Mark S. Fowler, and President Reagan at the
White House. Id.; Douglas Frantz, Both Sides in TV Rule Fight Give FCC Star Treat-
ment, L.A. TiMEs, Dec. 13, 1990, at Al, A30-31. Fowler later disclosed to congres-
sional investigators that he explained to the President that he agreed with both the
Department of Justice and the Department of Commerce, and favored repealing
the Fin-Syn rules. Rosencrans, supra note 11, at 70. Shortly after the meeting,
President Reagan announced a two-year moratorium on any action concerning the
Fin-Syn rules. Id.
47. Cf Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1047 (citing Hearings on S.1707 Before Subcomm. on
Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transp., 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 6, 9 (1984); Henry M. Sooshan III & Erwin G. Krasnow, New Checks, Balances
Affect FCC Policymaking, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 8, 1985, at 12).
48. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1047; Rosencrans, supra note 11, at 70.
49. Fox is a newcomer to the television broadcasting industry. It was created
through the production capability and film library of movie giant, Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1053; see Fox Broadcasting Co., 5 F.C.C.R. 3211
(1990).
50. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1047. The FCC stated:
On January 30, 1990, Fox Broadcasting Company (FBC) petitioned for
(1) resumption of rulemaking in BC Docket No. 82-345, the then pend-
ing docket reexamining the Commission's financial interest and syndica-
tion rules, and (2) a limited waiver of the rule defining "network" that
governs the applicability of those rules and the prime time access rule
(PTAR).
Fox Broadcasting Co., 5 F.C.C.R. 1. In its request, Fox attempted to: (1) avoid
application of the prime time access rules by requesting a temporary waiver for
itself and its affiliates; (2) entice the FCC to reconsider the proposed changes to
the Fin-Syn rules that forbid broadcast networks from engaging in the domestic
syndication of any program or the foreign syndication of independently-produced
programs and (3) convince the FCC to re-examine the portion of the Fin-Syn rules
that prohibit broadcast networks from obtaining any financial or proprietary right
or interest, in the exhibition, distribution, or use of programs produced by others
except for the exclusive right to network exhibition in the United States. See BC
Docket No. 82-345 (1990) (terminated and reconsidered in MM Docket No. 90-
162); Amendment of 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 0) (1) (i), (ii), the Syndication and Finan-
cial Interest Rules, 5 F.C.C.R. 1814 (1990); 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.6580)(1)(i),(ii),
0)(4),(k) (1989). In addition, Fox requested that the FCC re-open a previous
inquiry addressing the public interest in the repeal of the Fin-Syn rules. BC
Docket No. 82-345. Acting on Fox's request, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) to assess the effectiveness of the rules. Id.; see Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking in re the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, MM Docket
No. 90-162, issued March 14, 1990.
51. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1047.
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repealing the existing Fin-Syn rules, prompting the FCC to hold
one day of en banc hearings on the matter.52 The FCC adopted the
revised Fin-Syn rules in 1991 (1991 rules) without significant
changes to the original Fin-Syn rules.53 These revised rules: (1)
eliminated restrictions on network ownership and syndication of
network programming of all "dayparts"54 and all non-prime time 55
entertainment programming; (2) permitted networks to retain
complete rights to all "in-house productions";56 (3) permitted net-
works to fill up to forty percent of prime time entertainment sched-
ules with in-house productions; (4) allowed networks to acquire all
rights, including financial interests, domestic syndication rights and
foreign syndication rights, in non-network productions; (5) allowed
networks to syndicate network programs in foreign markets without
limitation; (6) allowed limited network participation in first-run
syndication; (7) created a new definition of network57 and (8) im-
posed reporting requirements on the networks. 58
B. Schurz
In 1992, Fox and the networks petitioned the Seventh Circuit 59
to invalidate the 1991 rules on the grounds that they were arbitrary
52. Id.; see also Rosencrans, supra note 11, at 70-71. The FCC decided to hold
hearings on the Fin-Syn rules due in part to the interest expressed by "various
segments of the television industry." Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1047. During the public
hearings the FCC heard reactions to the various compromise solutions advanced
by numerous parties interested in the debate. Rosencrans, supra note 11, at 70-71.
Various members of the television industry, including independent producers and
network and studio executives, utilized the hearings to strengthen their position in
favor of relaxing the Fin-Syn rules. Id. Meanwhile, the FCC continued to empha-
size that the hearing did not indicate the FCC's willingness to relax the rules. Id.
53. 47 C.F.R1 §§ 73.658(k), 73.659-73.662, 73.3526(a) (11) (1991). The deci-
sion to promulgate the new rules was made by a 3-2 majority of the FCC's Commis-
sioners. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1047. Two Commissioners dissented, including the
chairman of the Commission. Id. Nonetheless, the new rules were passed and
published, supplanting the old rules. Id.
54. Dayparts refers to daytime hours, the hours from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. in
the Eastern and Pacific Time Zones and from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. in the Central
and Mountain Time Zones. See United States v. CBS, 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,594, 77,171 (1980).
55. For a definition of prime time, see supra note 7.
56. The FCC defined "in-house productions" as network programs that are:
"(1) solely produced by the network; (2) co-produced by the network with foreign
production entities; or (3) co-produced by the network with outside domestic pro-
duction entities that initiate such arrangements." Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 3282,
n.72 (1993).
57. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.6580)(4) (1992).
58. Memorandum 0 & O, 7 F.C.C.R. 345,15 (1992); see also Final Rule, 56 Fed.
Reg. 26,242-01, 26,250 (1991).
59. The networks petitioned the Seventh Circuit because of its conservative,
economic-oriented approach. See ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, VOL.II
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and capricious. 6° The networks argued that the concerns which
prompted the FCC to adopt the original Fin-Syn restrictions had
expired, warranting the immediate repeal of the rules.61 The court
partly agreed with the networks and vacated the 1991 rules.62
During the Schurz proceedings the networks cited gradual
changes in the television industry since 1970.63 The networks in-
sisted that even if the original Fin-Syn rules were justified when they
were adopted, the rules were unwarranted in light of changes in the
industry.64 The court agreed with the networks that their power
(Prentice Hall Law & Business 1993). The Seventh Circuit's conservative majority
is led byJudge Richard Posner who advocates a close relationship between law and
economics. Id. Judge Posner believes that all law should follow the logic of eco-
nomics. Id. Specifically, Judge Posner advocates a free market, "supply side" eco-
nomic analysis. Id.
60. Schulz, 982 F.2d at 1048. The arbitrary and capricious standard thatJudge
Posner refers to is found in section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5
U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
In a related proceeding, outside producers and independent stations re-
quested that Judge Posner disqualify himself. Schurz Communications, Inc. v.
FCC, 982 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Schurz II]. The motion was based
on a 1977 affidavit submitted by Judge Posner as an expert witness for CBS in an
antitrust case. Id. at 1059; see United States v. NBC, 449 F. Supp. 1127 (C.D. Cal.
1978). The issues in both cases involved the degree to which television networks
should be restricted from participating in the production and distribution of tele-
vision programs. Schul II, 982 F.2d at 1059-60.
Judge Posner denied the motion for disqualification for several reasons. Id. at
1062. First, the movants waited until two weeks after Schurz was decided to file
their motion. Id. Consequently, Judge Posner determined that the motion was
"untimely." Id. at 1060 ("Litigants cannot take the heads-I-win-tails-you-lose posi-
tion of waiting to see whether they win and if they lose moving to disqualify ajudge
who voted against them."). Second, the movants did not satisfy the disqualification
standards set out in the statutory section entitled "Disqualification of Justice,
Judge, or Magistrate." 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1993).
61. See Schulz, 982 F.2d at 1043. For a discussion of the FCC's original con-
cerns regarding the networks' excessive power, see supra note 5 and accompanying
text.
62. Schulz, 982 F.2d at 1055. The court found that the 1991 rules impaired
the networks and acted as a barrier to new entrants in the production market. Id.
Additionally, the court stated that the FCC's opinion accompanying the 1991 rules
did not explain how the rules would promote diversity in programming. Id. The
court was also unable to find a rational reason to adopt this rule. Id. Finding the
FCC's opinion to be "unreasoned and unreasonable," the court vacated the FCC's
order and remanded the matter for further proceedings. Id.
63. For a discussion on the gradual changes within the television industry, see
supra note 9 and accompanying text.
64. Schuz, 982 F.2d at 1046. The underlying concern of the Fin-Syn rules, as
Judge Posner described it, was that the networks would abuse their dominant posi-
tion in program distribution to seize control over programming. Id. Judge Posner
explained that the networks would, in reality, be paying more for their program-
ming if they insisted on purchasing syndication rights simultaneously with the
right to display the program on their network. Id. In addition, if the networks
then refused to syndicate the program to independent stations, they would realize
1994]
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had diminished, 65 adding that the FCC's original concern regard-
ing the networks' abuse of power never had a clear basis.66 More-
over, the court found it unclear how the 1991 rules would redress
the networks' abuse of power.67
The court agreed with two important aspects of the FCC's 1991
Report and Order.6a First, the court acknowledged that the structure
of the television industry had changed significantly since the adop-
tion of the original Fin-Syn rules.69 Second, the court reiterated
that the FCC possesses the necessary authority to both regulate the
networks in the public interest7" and to restrict network program-
ming activities to promote program diversity.71
no return on their original investment in the syndication rights. Id. The networks'
only return would be a "long-shot" chance to weaken their competition. Id.
65. Id. Judge Posner acknowledged the "fierce" competition that existed
among the three original networks and the heightened competition with the addi-
tion of Fox. Id. Moreover, Judge Posner blamed the original Fin-Syn rules for the
increased concentration in the production of prime time programming because
the rules made television production a "riskier" business. Id. Judge Posner stated
that there was a 40% reduction in the producers of prime time programming in
the twenty years prior to Schuz and the eight largest producers increased their
share of prime time programming by 20% in the same period of time. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. Judge Posner reasoned that by prohibiting networks from buying syn-
dication rights outside producers would be paid less for programs. Id. The court
stated that television production is a risky venture because producers are con-
stantly searching for a successful program that makes it into syndication after an
extended "first run." Id. Producers rely on syndication to recover the losses from
other short-lived entertainment programs. Id. By prohibiting networks from
purchasing syndication rights producers are prevented from shifting the risk of
production to the networks. Id. The court stated that the networks are better able
to bear the risk of production, leaving producers free to create new programs.
Furthermore, independent stations would have a larger and more competitive sup-
ply of programs. Id.
68. Id. at 1046, 1048; Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest
Rules, Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 8 F.C.C.R. 223 (1993)
[hereinafter Second Notice] (seeking public comment on how to resolve concerns
expressed by Schun court).
69. Second Notice, 8 F.C.C.R. 4. For a discussion on the gradual changes
affecting the television industry, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
70. The court stated that the FCC is empowered "to act in accordance with
the public interest, convenience, or necessity." Schun, 982 F.2d at 1048 (citing 47
U.S.C. § 303 (1988); FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1981);
FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 810 (1978); NBC
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943)). The court noted that the FCC is
armed with broad discretion and referred to the public interest standard as nebu-
lous. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1048. The court then discussed the resultant impractica-
bility of "responsible" judicial review. Id. The court also noted further
complications of its ability to review the FCC'sjudgment, calling the FCC's notice-
and-comment rulemaking proceeding a "voluminous, largely self-serving commen-
tary uncabined by any principles of reliability, let alone by the rules of evidence."
Id.
71. Schurz. 982 F.2d at 1048.
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Despite these areas of agreement with the FCC, the court
found that the FCC did not adequately address all of the objections
raised during the Fin-Syn proceedings in its decision accompanying
the 1991 rules. 72 The court decided that an administrative agency's
statement which accompanies the promulgation of a rule must
show that the rule is rational.73 The court applied the rational stan-
dard to the 1991 rules and determined that the FCC's justifications
for the rules were inadequate.74 Specifically, the court stated that
the FCC failed to explain fundamental concepts, disregarded vital
evidence and ignored formerly persuasive arguments.7 5 Conse-
quently, the court held that the 1991 rules were not "adequately
reasoned" and remanded the rules to the FCC for repeal or
modification.7 6
The court recognized that a decision to vacate the 1991 rules
could be construed as reinstating the 1970 rules because the FCC's
order both adopted the 1991 rules and vacated the 1970 rules.77 In
light of this possible interpretation, the Seventh Circuit issued a
temporary stay of its decision and requested "supplemental briefs
advising [the court] as to the best course to follow in this unusual
situation."78
The court considered several options in a supplemental pro-
ceeding.79 The court ultimately decided between two options; al-
72. Second Notice, 8 F.C.C.R. 1 5.
73. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1049 ("It is not enough that a rule might be rational;
the statement accompanying its promulgation must show that it is rational - must
demonstrate that a reasonable person upon consideration of all the points urged
pro and con the rule would conclude that it was a reasonable response to a prob-
lem that the agency was charged with solving."); see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. v.
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) ("[T]he agency must ex-
amine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action in-
cluding a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.'"
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))).
For a further discussion on the court's standard of review when confronted with an
administrative agency's rule, see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
74. Second Notice, 8 F.C.C.R. 5. For a further discussion on the inadequacies
of the 1991 rules, see infra notes 95-120 and accompanying text.
75. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1050.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1055. The court did not want the public to think that the 1970 rules
would "spring back" into effect. Id. Originally the court thought that one network
had defended the resumption of the 1970 rules and had requested that the por-
tion of the FCC's order that vacated the "old" rules be left undisturbed. Id. In the
supplemental proceeding, however, the court corrected itself, and stated that "no
part[ies] to the proceeding... had defended the old rules." Id. at 1055.
78. Id. at 1056. The court stayed its decision for 30 days. Id. at 1055.
79. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1055-56. The court, relying on the supplemental
briefs, chose from five suggested alternatives. Id. First, the court could have va-
cated the FCC's order, thereby reinstating the 1970 rules. Id. Second, the court
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low the original rules to remain in effect or allow the television
industry to operate without the Fin-Syn rules 8 0 The court chose
the latter, issuing a decision that vacated the FCC's 1991 order, ex-
cept for the portions that invalidated the 1970 Fin-Syn rules.8 '
However, the court stayed its decision to allow the FCC sufficient
time to draft new or modified rules.82
C. Developments After Schurz
After the Seventh Circuit issued its decision in Schurz, the FCC
released a notice stating its intention to comply with the court's
order.83 In this notice, the FCC expressed its intention to re-evalu-
ate the 1991 order supporting the new rules.8 4 In 1993, the FCC
could have vacated the entire FCC order except for the repeal of the 1970 rules,
thereby allowing the networks' unsupervised reign over the production and distri-
bution of television programs until further action by the FCC. Id. at 1056. Third,
the court could have allowed the 1991 rules to remain in effect by issuing no order
and simply remanding the matter to the FCC for further proceedings. Id. Fourth,
the court could have vacated the entire FCC order, but stayed the decision for a
specified amount of time, after which it would become automatically effective. Id.
Finally, the court could have vacated the entire FCC order except for the repeal of
the 1970 rules, but stayed the decision for a specified amount of time. Id.
80. Id. at 1057.
81. Id. The court was operating under the assumption that the FCC would
not be able to devise new or modified rules, even after a reasonable amount of
time. 1d.
82. Id. The court chose between a 90 day or a 120 day stay. Id.; see Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (giving Con-
gress three months to enact new bankruptcy statute, while existing bankruptcy
courts continued operations); Board of Trade v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1989)
(imposing 120 day stay ofjudgment invalidating administrative regulation). Decid-
ing on the 120 day period, the court suggested that the FCC take 30 days to rewrite
the rules, 45 days to solicit comments from the public, 15 days to redraft the pro-
posed rules in accordance with the public's comments, leaving the FCC with the
statutorily required 30 day period between publication and the effective date of a
new rule. Schur,- 982 F.2d at 1057; Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(d) (3) (1988) (requiring rules to be published 30 days before they become
effective, but allowing shortened periods "for good cause").
83. See Second Notice, 8 F.C.C.R. 223, 1 1 (1993). The FCC issued this notice in
compliance with the 120 day deadline imposed by the court. Id. 1 10 (citing
Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1043). For a discussion on the court's decision to stay its order
for 120 days, see supra note 82.
84. Second Notice, 8 F.C.C.R. 1 10. The FCC also displayed its willingness to
revise or rewrite the 1991 rules. Id. The FCC invited the submission of public
comments to assist in its impending decision to either support the 1991 rules or
propose revised rules. Id. The FCC limited these submissions by requesting all
comments directly address the court's stated concerns. Id.
The FCC also ordered an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) prior to
the issuance of its Second Notice. Id. I 11. The analysis, required by section 603 of
the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C §§ 601-612 (1988), examined the "expected
impact of the [ ]proposed policies and rules on small entities." Second Notice, 8
F.C.C.R. 1 11 (analysis set forth in Appendix A).
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issued modified Fin-Syn rules (1993 rules).8 5 The 1993 rules: (1)
removed all restrictions on network acquisition of financial interest
and syndication rights in programs on network stations, except for
some reporting requirements; (2) prohibited networks from active
domestic syndication; (3) eliminated affiliate favoritism restraints,
but retained the prohibition on program warehousing;8 6 (4) re-
tained the network restrictions on first-run domestically syndicated
programming; (5) continued to permit networks to purchase for-
eign syndication rights and to actively syndicate them abroad; (6)
continued to permit networks to own and syndicate non-prime time
and non-entertainment network programming; (7) exempted
"emerging networks"87 from all restrictions, except for modified re-
porting requirements and (8) resolved to eliminate all remaining
Fin-Syn restrictions within two years after modified consent decrees
are issued. 88
Soon after the FCC adopted the 1993 rules, the United States
District Court for the Central District of California approved modi-
fications to the network consent decrees.89 The United States,
which acted as plaintiff in the consent judgments, consented to the
modifications.90 The district court repealed two portions of both
the 1978 consent decree entered with NBC and the 1980 consent
decrees entered with ABC and CBS and consequently repealed por-
tions of the remaining Fin-Syn restrictions.9' First, the court re-
moved the provision that prohibited the networks from acquiring
85. See Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 3282 (1993. The 1993 rules were adopted by
the FCC on April 1, 1993, satisfying the 120 day deadline imposed by the court in
Schurz. 982 F.2d at 1055.
86. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.660(c) (1992). Warehousing refers to the act of "delay-
ing ... the syndication of programming to the detriment of non-network stations."
Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 1 59; see also Tentative Decision, 94 F.C.C.2d 1019, 1096
(1983) (defining warehousing as network practice of withholding programs in ef-
fort to increase programs' market price).
87. The FCC stated that it will treat an entity as an "emerging network" if it
does not qualify under the statutory definition of network as of the effective date of
the 1993 rules. Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 1 99; see 47 C.F.R. § 73.662(i) (1992) (now
redesignated as § 73.662(f) in 58 Fed. Reg. 28,927-01 (1993)). If the exemption is
met prior to the effective date, it remains intact, even if the "emerging network"
subsequently qualifies as a network. Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 1 99; 58 Fed. Reg.
28,927-01, 28,932 (1993) (adding new paragraph (g) to 47 C.F.IR § 73.662 which
defines "emerging network" as "an entity not meeting the definition of a 'television
network' . . . on June 5, 1993, but which subsequently meets this definition").
88. Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 1 3.
89. United States v. NBC, Nos. CV74-3601-R, CV74-3600-R & CV74-3599-R,
1993 WL 523457 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 1993).
90. Id. at *1.
91. Id. For a further discussion on the network consent decrees, see supra
note 35 and accompanying text.
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financial interests in television programs used by non-networks and
produced by others or from participating in the domestic syndica-
tion business.92 Second, the court deleted the provision that pro-
hibited the networks from making the purchase of network rights
to a program contingent upon the supplier's grant of any other
right or interest to the networks.93 The court relied on the 1993
rules' two year sunset provision and the dramatic changes in the
television industry to support its decision to partially lift the restric-
tions on the networks.94
Ill. ANALYsis
A. The Schurz Court's Objections to the 1991 Rules
The Seventh Circuit based its decision to vacate the 1991 Fin-
Syn rules on the FCC's inadequate justification for the rules. 95 The
court believed that the FCC's Report and Order supporting the 1991
rules insufficiently addressed the rules' effects on program sources
and outlet diversity.96 The court criticized the FCC's majority re-
port, identifying five particular issues for the FCC to address when
modifying the 1991 rules.97
First, the court charged the FCC with ignoring the networks'
argument that the 1991 rules were unsuccessful because they did
not, in fact, increase network access to the programming market.98
92. United States v. NBC, Nos. CV74-3601-R, CV74-3600-R & CV74-3599-R,
1993 WL 523457, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 1993).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1049-50; see also Second Notice, 8 F.C.C.R. 223, 1 5
(1993); SecondR & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 3282, 15 (1993). The court stated that the FCC's
report dismissed certain arguments raised during the proceedings without ade-
quate explanation. Schur7, 982 F.2d at 1049-50. The court stated:
The Commission's articulation of its grounds is not adequately reasoned.
Key concepts are left unexplained, key evidence is overlooked, arguments
that formerly persuaded the Commission and that time has only strength-
ened are ignored, contradictions within and among Commission deci-
sions are passed over in silence. The impression created is of
unprincipled compromises of Rube Goldberg complexity among con-
tending interest groups viewed merely as clamoring suppliants who have
somehow to be conciliated .... The Commission must do better in artic-
ulating their justification.
Id. at 1050.
96. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1049-50.
97. Id. at 1050. Acknowledging the length of the FCC's report, the court pro-
ceeded to describe the FCC's majority opinion as "boilerplate," "self-congratula-
tory" and replete with "multifarious contentions." Id. The court stated, "[s] tripped
of its verbiage, the opinion, like a Persian cat with its fur shaved, is alarmingly pale
and thin." Id.
98. Id.; see Second Notice, 8 F.C.C.R. 1 6.
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In the 1991 rules, the FCC imposed a thirty-day, two-step negotia-
tions separation requirement on network acquisition of financial in-
terests and syndication rights (back-end rights) 99 which was
intended to allow the networks to purchase syndication rights from
non-network producers. 10 0 The restriction on the acquisition of
back-end rights necessitated a two-step negotiation procedure for
network acquisition of Fin-Syn rights.1 01 The networks argued that
the restriction on back-end rights actually reduced the networks'
ability to effectively bid for available programming.102 Conse-
quently, as the court noted, the number of potential buyers avail-
able to non-network producers decreased 0 3 and diversity in
programming sources diminished.1 04
Second, the court explained that the 1991 rules would not pre-
vent the networks from using their market power to purchase pro-
gramming at favorably low prices.10 5 The court stated that the rules
did not appear to be designed to prevent the networks from utiliz-
99. The FCC described back-end rights as network acquisitions of financial
interests in prime time, non-network entertainment programming. Memorandum 0
& 0, 7 F.C.C.R 345, 26 (1992).
100. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1051. The 1991 rules were "intended to grant the
networks substantial new latitude in purchasing back-end rights in network prime
time entertainment programming, by permitting network acquisition of financial
interests and passive domestic and foreign syndication rights in all such programs,
subject to the following restrictions." Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 1 13 (footnote
omitted). The restrictions were:
(a) A network could only purchase such interests and rights in outside
productions pursuant to negotiations separate from, and initiated no less
than 30 days after, execution of the network license fee agreement ....
(b) Co-production arrangements between a network and a domestic pro-
ducer could be initiated only by the outside producer, who would be pro-
vided a 30-day cooling-off period before the arrangement became
binding.
(c) A network was required to certify that access to its schedule was not
conditioned on the acquisition of such interests and rights.
(d) ... [A] network could not condition access to its network on a pro-
ducer granting interests and rights in other programs that would air
elsewhere.
(e) Networks were required to maintain semi-annual reports in their
owned and operated stations' public files.
Id.
101. Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 1 6.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105: Id. 7. The FCC believed that the court was suggesting that the net-
works would "play the market" as if it were at peak competitiveness regardless of
the 1991 rules. Id. The networks would accomplish this by taking full advantage of
their still existent market power. Id. As an example, the networks could insist that
they pay reduced prices for back-end rights. Id.
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ing whatever market power they possessed."°6 Under the 1991 rules
the networks could apparently circumvent the rules by flaunting
their market power and insisting that the licensing fees be re-
duced.'0 7 The court reasoned that the new rules would limit net-
work syndication, but producers' cost of production would increase
and their programming fees would remain constant.'08
Third, the court contended that the 1991 rules limited compe-
tition with established networks' 0 9 by stunting the growth of new
networks. 1" 0 For example, the court noted that Fox must supply
fewer than fifteen hours per week of prime time programming to its
affiliates to maintain its exemption from the 1991 rules."'
Although the consequences of this limitation on developing net-
106. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1052.
107. Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 1 7. The court suggested that rules forbidding
business transactions with firms perceived to possess market power would not ben-
efit inferior parties. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1052. The court illustrated this point with
the following hypothetical:
Suppose that in a competitive market a network would pay $2 million for
first-run rights to some program and $1 million for syndication rights, for
a total of $3 million, but that because of the lack of perfect substitutes for
using this network to distribute his program the producer is willing to sell
each of these rights to the network for half their competitive-market value
(i.e., for $1 million and $500,000 respectively). The producer is made no
better off by being forbidden to sell the syndication rights to the network.
He gets the same meager first-run license fee ($1 million) and now must
cast about for another buyer for the syndication rights. That other buyer
is unlikely to pay more than the network would ($500,000); otherwise the
producer would have sold the syndication rights to him in the first place.
Id.
108. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1052. The court hypothesized that if it was correct,
the 1991 rules "cannot increase the prices that producers receive." Id. Addition-
ally, the court attributed the increase in production costs to the producers' inabil-
ity to secure financing from the networks, therefore, the producers were exposed
to greater and more costly risks. Id.; see Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 1 7.
109. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1053. For a discussion on the statutory definition of
networks, see supra note 1.
110. Schuz, 982 F.2d at 1053. Specifically, the court referred to the emer-
gence of the Fox network. Id. For a discussion of Fox's origin, see supra note 49.
111. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1053. In 1990, Fox only supplied 12 to 14 hours of
prime time programming per week to its affiliates in order to maintain its exemp-
tion from the 1991 rules. Id.; see Fox Broadcasting Co., 5 F.C.C.R. 3211 (1990). If
Fox were to reach or exceed 15 hours of prime time programming per week, the
Fin-Syn rules would also apply to Fox. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1053. Citing the impor-
tance of program production to its overall growth as a network, Fox argued that its
inability to expand its prime time programming has stunted its growth. Id.; see
Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 1 8. However, the court recognized the argument that
the rules may "induce Fox to divest its production or network arms, so that the
network can grow without constraining Fox's production activities." Schuz, 982
F.2d at 1053.
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works were unclear," 2 the court was concerned that the FCC failed
to address the resulting argument that its rules may limit, and not
foster, competition with the established networks." 3
Fourth, the court criticized the FCC's handling of administra-
tive precedent.11 4 The court asserted that the FCC failed to recon-
cile its order supporting the 1991 rules with its Tentative Decision." 5
Although the FCC did cite its 1983 Tentative Decision, the court was
concerned that the FCC failed to discuss its conclusions116
Finally, the court was concerned that the FCC never defined
the word "diversity" as it applied to television programming. 117
Without an explicit discussion of the various types of diversity, it was
impossible to ascertain the FCC's intended meaning of the word." 18
112. For a discussion on the Fox waiver, see supra notes 1, 50 and accompany-
ing text.
113. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1053. Since Fox's affiliates are traditionally vulnera-
ble UHF stations, a weakened Fox translates into weakened independent stations.
Id. The court was deeply troubled that the FCC did not mention this consequence
in its report. Id.
114. Id. While administrative agencies are not restricted when dealing with
agency precedent, Judge Posner stated that the FCC should have, at least, ex-
plained its departure from precedent. Id. (citing Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 740
F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1984); Continental Web Press, Inc. v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 1087 (7th
Cir. 1984)).
115. Schuz, 982 F.2d at 1053. The FCC made three significant findings in its
1983 Tentative Decision: (1) it rejected the notion that the major broadcast networks
had significant market power by 1983; (2) it concluded that the Fin-Syn rules pre-
vented efficient risk-sharing, thus supporting repeal of the financial interest restric-
tions and retention of the syndication constraints and (3) it decided that all Fin-
Syn rules should be phased out by 1990. Id.; see Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 19 (citing
Tentative Decision, 94 F.C.C.2d 1019 (1983)).
116. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1053. The court found that the FCC failed to recon-
cile its Tentative Decision with its report on the 1991 rules. Id. (citing Tentative Deci-
sion, 94 F.C.C.2d at 1019). Furthermore, the court stated that the FCC did not
discuss the events of the eight years between the Tentative Decision and the 1991
rules. Id. In addition, the court noted that the FCC was guided by the following
standard for evaluating the network restrictions: "'the Commission should not in-
tervene in the market except where there is evidence of a market failure and a
regulatory solution is available that is likely to improve the net welfare of the con-
suming public.'" Id. (citing Tentative Decision, 94 F.C.C.2d at 1055). However, the
FCC never addressed this standard in its justification for the 1991 rules. Schurz,
982 F.2d at 1053.
117. Schuz, 982 F.2d at 1054. In its failure to define "diversity," the FCC
never established the different meanings of the word or how these meanings re-
lated to each other. Id. The court briefly described the different meanings that
have been attributed to the word diversity. Id. The court initially distinguished
between source diversity and outlet diversity. Id. Source diversity refers to pro-
gramming sources, such as producers, while outlet diversity refers to distribution
outlets, such as television stations. Id. In addition, the court described a third
form of diversity, namely "diversity in programming" which meant variety of pro-
grams. Id.
118. Id. The court assumed that the FCC considers source diversity and out-
let diversity as "means to the end of programming diversity." Id.
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Absent a definition,1 1 9 the court found it difficult to determine
whether the FCC was properly promoting the intended goal of in-
creased programming diversity.
12 0
The FCC noted the Seventh Circuit's concerns regarding the
1991 rules and requested comments on how to resolve the court's
concerns. 12 1 The FCC subsequently issued modified rules in
1993.122
B. Post-Schurz Modifications to the Fin-Syn Rules
The FCC amended the 1991 rules in a Report and Order is-
sued in 1993.123 The FCC's decision to modify the rules came after
it analyzed the continuing changes in television's program produc-
tion and syndication markets.' 24 The FCC's modifications con-
tained four general provisions. 25
First, the 1993 rules permit networks to acquire financial inter-
est and syndication rights in network prime time entertainment
programming. 126 The FCC removed the network restrictions on
the acquisition of Fin-Syn rights thus addressing the court's con-
cerns that the 1991 rules limited, rather than promoted, diversity
119. Id. The court was concerned that the FCC may have interpreted diversity
to mean "sheer number [s]." Id. The court did not agree that greater numbers of
producers and outlets solely constituted diversity. Id.
120. Id. The court stated that the rules hinder the production of television
programs, as well as the interest in diverse programming. Id. Judge Posner stated
"[t]he rules appear to handicap the networks and by handicapping them to retard
new entry into production; how all this promotes programming diversity is mysteri-
ous, and was left unexplained in the Commission's opinion." Id. at 1055.
121. See Second Notice, 8 F.C.C.R. 223, 1 1 (1993).
122. See Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 3282 (1993).
123. Id. The FCC's modified rules became effective on June 5, 1993, except
for the reporting requirements that became effective upon approval by the Office
of Management and Budget. Id. 1 120. In addition, the FCC issued a Final Regu-
latory Flexibility Analysis pursuant to the 1980 Regulatory Flexibility Act. Id. at
Appendix B. For a discussion on the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, see
supra note 84.
124. Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 1.
125. The FCC did not completely repeal the Fin-Syn rules. Id. However, in
order for the rules to remain in effect after the two year sunset period proponents
of the remaining Fin-Syn restrictions must persuade the FCC that retention is war-
ranted. Id.
126. Id. 1 12. The FCC met the court's objection that the 1991 rules limited
network procurement of back-end rights by removing all restrictions on the acqui-
sition of Fin-Syn rights in network prime time entertainment programming. Id.
The court objected to the 1991 limitations on back-end rights because the court
believed that the limitations had negative effects on program and source diversity.
Id. 1 16 (citing Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1043).
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and competition. 127 The court also sought a more thorough justifi-
cation from the FCC for its decision in 1991 to continue regulating
network procurement of Fin-Syn rights. 128 In 1993, the FCC stated
that lifting the restraints on network participation in the program-
ming acquisition process would inevitably bolster market competi-
tion and increase program diversity.' 29
Second, the FCC amended its restrictions on network partici-
pation in the syndication of off-network °30 programs 13' The 1993
rules permit networks to acquire domestic and foreign syndication
rights in off-network programming. 3 2 However, the rules still for-
bid the networks from actively syndicating these programs in the
domestic market. 133 The FCC requires networks to verify compli-
127. Id. The FCC addressed the court's concerns regarding Fin-Syn rights by
referring to comments received during the remand period. The FCC then specifi-
cally addressed the concerns enumerated in Schun. Id. 11 19-54. The FCC dis-
cussed at length the arguments presented on remand by both the Coalition to
Preserve the Financial Interest and Syndication Rule (Coalition) and the networks.
Id. 11 19-39. The Coalition argued that the programming market is not competi-
tive and that the 30 day negotiations separation requirement ensures network com-
pliance when acquiring back-end rights. Id. 11 19-29. The networks countered
that they no longer possess significant market power and if they did the rules could
not prevent them from using it. Id. 1 30-39.
128. See Schuz, 982 F.2d at 1049-50.
129. Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 41. The FCC believed that there will be addi-
tional funding for non-network programming without the imposition of acquisi-
tion restrictions. Id. 40. For example, the FCC noted that independent
producers will rely on the networks carrying their programs to finance program-
ming production deficits. Id. In turn, competition will sprout in the bidding for
financial interests among production studios, independent syndicators and other
program production financial sources. Id. In addition, networks may be more
willing to take investment risks in particular programming, resulting in an increase
in prime time entertainment program investments. Id.
130. Off-network programming refers to programming that has formerly ap-
peared on a network. Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules,
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 5 F.C.C.R. 6463, 1 34 (1990).
131. Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 57. The FCC responded to the two issues
raised by the court regarding the syndication portion of the Fin-Syn rules. Id. 1 60
(citing Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1043). First, the FCC reconciled its Fin-Syn restrictions
with the suggested restrictions enumerated in its Tentative Decision. Second R & 0, 8
F.C.C.R. 1[ 70-73, 78, 83; see generaly Tentative Decsion, 94 F.C.C.2d 1019 (1983).
Second, the FCC clarified how its rules promoted diversity. Second R & 0, 8
F.C.C.R. 1 62-74.
132. Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 1 57. The domestic restrictions in the 1993
rules ban the networks from actively syndicating off-network programs (including
programs produced in-house) in the domestic market. Id. 1 68. This requires the
networks to employ independent syndicators to distribute their off-network pro-
gramming domestically. Id. 67. The FCC asserted that the 1993 domestic mar-
ket restrictions were consistent with the goals of advancing diversity and
competition and were consistent with its Tentative Decision. Id. 11 68-74.
133. Id. 1 71-72. The only issue left unresolved by this portion of the 1993
rules was the status of the gradual repeal of the syndication restrictions. Id. The
FCC suggested a seven year phase out of syndication restrictions ending in 1990.
1994]
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ance with the ban on active domestic syndication in their public
files and to maintain additional reports with the FCC.134 Moreover,
the 1993 rules retain the "anti-warehousing safeguard"13 5 and re-
peal the "affiliate favoritism safeguard."13 6
Third, the FCC adopted provisions to exempt "emerging net-
works" 13 7 from most of the Fin-Syn regulations. 138 According to the
FCC, the exemption will enable developing networks to better com-
pete with the established networks.'3 9 Specifically, the exemption
will increase the amount of broadcasting made available to in-
Tentative Decision, 94 F.C.C.2d 1 209. The 1993 rules provide for all remaining
syndication restraints to expire two years after modification of the relevant consent
decrees. Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 11 72, 112-13, 117. The FCC will conduct an
inquiry 18 months after the consent decrees are issued to entertain arguments for
the rules' retention. Id. 11 113, 118. Barring any FCC action extending the syndi-
cation restrictions, the rules will expire six months after the FCC inquiry begins,
two years after modification of the consent decrees. Id. 1 119.
134. Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 1 57. The reports required by the 1993 rules
must be maintained semi-annually and are only necessary for stations that are
owned and operated by the networks. Id. The reports must provide specific infor-
mation on network program acquisition and syndication activities, in addition to
certifying compliance with the active domestic syndication restriction. Id.
135. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.660(c) (1992). The FCC sided with independent sta-
tions in its decision to retain the "anti-warehousing safeguard." Second R & 0, 8
F.C.C.R. 1 75. The FCC concluded that the need for warehousing precautions had
not lapsed, citing its concerns regarding competition and outlet diversity. Id. 11
75-79.
The "anti-warehousing safeguard," adopted in 1991, required a network to
make available its syndication rights in prime time entertainment programming, at
the earlier of (1) four years after the program's network debut or (2) within 180
days of the final airing of the program on a network. Id. 1 59; see 47 C.F.R.
§§ 73.660(c) (1), (2).
136. Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 1 57; see 47 C.F.R. § 73.660(b) (1992). The
1991 rules contained a rebuttable presumption of affiliate favoritism if a network
syndicated programming to more than 30% of the market where the program is
sold. Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 1 59. The FCC created the presumption because
the independent stations expressed concern regarding the networks' ability and
incentive to favor network affiliates in market distribution of syndication rights. Id.
1 80. However, the FCC agreed with the networks, finding that the affiliate favorit-
ism safeguards were unnecessary due to the domestic syndication ban and the pro-
gramming acquisition reporting requirements. Id. 11 80-82.
137. For a discussion on the 1993 definition of "emerging network," see supra
note 87.
138. Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 11 99-108. The definition of network is un-
changed by the 1993 rules. Id. 1 99. For a further discussion of the 1992 defini-
tion of network, see supra note 1.
139. Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 1 99. The court expressed concern that
"emerging networks" would be discouraged from programming to the full 15 hour
capacity. Schu-z, 982 F.2d at 1053. Both the court and the FCC refer to Fox's
development to illustrate how the Fin-Syn rules operate as a disincentive to devel-
oping networks. See id.; Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 11 100-02. In an effort to avoid
application of the Fin-Syn rules, Fox has limited its prime time programming to
under 16 hours per week. Schuz, 982 F.2d at 1053. The restraints on "emerging
networks" resulted in less programming choices for their affiliates, limited compe-
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dependent broadcast stations. 140 However, emerging networks will
not be completely uninhibited by the exemption because they will
still be subject to the FCC's reporting requirements once they
broadcast more than sixteen hours141 of prime time programming
per week. 142 Consequently, the "emerging network" exemption
addresses the diversity and competition concerns expressed by the
Schurz court, without deterring the development of new
networks.143
Finally, the 1993 rules preserve the 1991 restrictions on net-
work participation in the domestic first-run programming mar-
ket.' 44 The rules continue to permit networks to hold financial
interests and syndication rights in domestic first-run syndication of
programming produced entirely in-house. 45 The FCC permitted
this continuation because it recognized that the networks needed
some leeway with respect to the first-run production market.' 46
However, networks will still be precluded from syndicating any first-
run programming within the United States.' 47
tition with the established network and reduced incentive to grow into a major
broadcast network. Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 11 100-02.
140. Citing Fox as an example, the FCC acknowledged that independent sta-
tions have been deprived of "quality first-run programming" because Fox, as an
emerging network, refuses to break the 15 hour programming threshold. Second R
& 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 1 104. Recognizing that Fox has increased source diversity and
bolstered the strength of marginal independent stations, the FCC dismissed appli-
cation of the Fin-Syn rules to emerging networks as "unwarranted." Id. 1 105.
141. Id. 1 99. The 16 hour requirement has not changed from the "more
than fifteen hours per week" required by the 1991 rules. See Final Rule, 56 Fed.
Reg. 26,242-01 (1991).
142. Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 1 99. Reporting requirements will be imposed
on emerging networks when they supply prime time programming to intercon-
nected affiliates. Id. 1 107. The reporting requirements are perceived as a method
of monitoring the emerging networks' programming practices to ensure that they
do not engage in any conduct that contradicts the design of the Fin-Syn rules. Id.
In addition, the FCC views the reporting requirements as a minimal burden com-
pared to the application of all of the Fin-Syn rules and believes that the reporting
requirements are unlikely to discourage emerging networks from increasing their
prime time programming. Id. For a further discussion on the FCC's reporting
requirements, see supra note 134 and accompanying text.
143. Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 1 108.
144. Id. 1 84. The FCC asserted that the Schun court paid little attention to
syndication matters, preferring to question the relation between the 1991 rules
and the Tentative Decision and any negative effects the 1991 rules had on diversity.
Id. 85
145. Second R & 0, 8 F.C.C.R. 11 88-89. The 1991 rules also permitted net-
works to acquire financial interests and syndication rights in first-run syndicated
programming distributed outside of the United States, regardless of where the pro-
gramming was produced. Id. 89.
146. Id. 88-89.
147. Id. 11 93-95.
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IV. IMPACT
The FCC responded to the Second Circuit's order with a com-
prehensive discussion supporting the 1993 rules. By promulgating
the 1993 rules, the FCC sought to create a competitive balance be-
tween the networks and independent producers, without compro-
mising the public's interest in programming selection. While the
FCC's primary interest in modifying the 1991 rules was to increase
programming for the television viewing audience, the FCC had a
particular view towards maximizing programming diversity and in-
creasing market competition. The 1993 rules are the cautious, but
successful, result of the FCC's efforts.
During the court's proceedings to modify the 1991 rules, the
FCC acknowledged that network dominance in the television indus-
try had decreased significantly since 1970 and that intense competi-
tion between the networks existed. In adopting the 1993 rules, the
FCC suggested that it was relying on these changes and safeguards
on "emerging networks" to foster competition and increase
diversity.
Based on these factors and the technological advances in the
television industry, there is, justifiably, no longer a fear of network
monopolization. The 1993 rules lifted many of the limitations on
network acquisitions of financial interest and syndication rights.
Additionally, the consent decrees that the United States entered
into with the networks have already been partially repealed. More-
over, the court cited the 1993 rules' eventual elimination of the
restrictions as one reason to grant the consent decree modifica-
tions.1 48 As one author stated, "should the FCC's remaining fin-syn
rules expire as expected within the next two years, the big three
[networks] will be able to plunge even deeper into the business of
actively selling off-network as well as first-run programming."'1 49
As a result of these modifications, networks will once again be
permitted to compete in the television industry and market compe-
tition and diversity will inevitably increase. The FCC, confident that
the 1993 rules will accomplish its goals, will dissolve the remaining
Fin-Syn rules in two years, if not sooner.
Christopherj Pepe
148. See United States v. NBC, Nos. CV74-3601-R, CV74-3600-R & CV74-3599-
R, 1993 WL 523457 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 1993).
149. See Joe Flint, Networks Win, Hollywood Winces as Fin-Syn Barriers Fa4
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 22, 1993, at 6.
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